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24 September 2019 
 
 
Australian Government 
Department of Industry, Innovation, and Science (DIIS) 
Industry House, 10 Binara Street, Canberra ACT 2601. 
 
 
Re: Submission in Response to Review of the ADGSM: International trade and investment law 
perspective 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to make this contribution to the review of the ADGSM.  
 
This submission summarises the author’s ongoing research on the ADGSM and Australia’s potential 
liability under international trade and investment laws. The following paragraphs highlight arguments 
that will enable the DIIS to determine the appropriate structuring of the ADGSM or any successor 
regime from a trade and investment angle. 
 
 
1) Understanding Australia’s potential liability under WTO law and international 
investment laws 
 
By being a party to an increasingly complex web of multilateral and bilateral trade and investment 
treaties, Australian policies may trigger liability under the law of World Trade Organisation (WTO) or 
through investment treaties providing for investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS).  
 
The difference between the two systems is that the WTO dispute settlement system is applied on a 
state-to-state basis under the WTO norms, whereas the ISDS mechanism allows the foreign investors to 
directly seek redress against the host state within the framework of a settled Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) or a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  
 
The Australian Government must carefully tread a fine line when applying the ADGSM. It must 
ensure a judicious and legitimate application of the ADGSM mechanism because any use perceived as 
unjustifiable may entail liability under WTO law through a state-espousal strategy. 1 The state-espousal 
 
1 Briefly, the state-espousal strategy may be used by well-endowed, multi-national corporations (MNCs) to access the, 
otherwise off-limits WTO dispute settlement system through espousal of investor claims by their governments against 
Australia. For example, the action launched by Cuba, Indonesia, Ukraine, Honduras and Dominican Republic against the 
Australian tobacco plain-packaging legislation in the WTO, alleging violation of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This action was launched in parallel to ISDS proceedings instituted by 
Philip Morris under the Hong Kong–Australia BIT. See generally Panel Report, Australia — Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WTO Doc WT/DS435/R; WT/DS441/R; WT/DS458/R; WT/DS467/R (28 June 2018). In this 
case, the WTO panel endorsed Australia’s plain packaging laws by holding that they contributed to improving public 
health by reducing and discouraging use of tobacco products: [7.228]–[7.232], [7.1725], [7.1731], [7.2794]–[7.2795]; 
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strategy shows that well-endowed MNCs can sometimes challenge prejudicial governmental measures 
with high-cost implications.    
 
From a purely WTO perspective, the Australian Government can take comfort in the knowledge that 
foreign investors in LNG projects cannot immediately challenge the imposition of the ADGSM under the 
norms of WTO. Rather, the challenge must come through another WTO Member and must be based on a 
breach of WTO law. Therefore, for action under WTO law, the MNCs will have to lobby their respective 
governments for the espousal of their claims against Australia within the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
 
The same foreign investors can, at the same time, rely on BITs that Australia has signed and ratified 
for seeking redress. The BITs usually include obligations to treat foreign investors fairly and not to 
expropriate the investments, whether directly or indirectly, without adequate compensation.  
 
The implication of the obligations to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably is often referred to 
as the National Treatment (NT) standards. Since foreign investors may have invested in the Australian 
LNG sector with the expectation of extracting and exporting gas from Australia, any limits on such 
activity in the form of export caps or quotas or any such restrictions may potentially be viewed as 
indirect expropriation. The export restrictions will only be considered as permissible if they are seen to 
satisfy a legitimate public purpose and if the restrictions apply uniformly to all investors (local and 
foreign).  
 
A quick survey of major LNG projects in Australia along with the origin of the investor and 
corresponding BITs shows several intertwining layers of potential liability owed by Australia to foreign 
investors (see Annex 1). This is especially true in the case of Gladstone LNG (GLNG) where, for example, 
Malaysian investment can be safeguarded under either ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area 
(AANZFTA) or Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement (MAFTA).  
 
The AANZFTA specifically includes an Annex on Expropriation and Compensation to Chapter 11 of the 
agreement which will play an important interpretational role in the event of an ISDS challenge to 
Australian policies. Note that Paragraph 4 of the Annex on Expropriation and Compensation specifically 
alludes to measures that are intended to “…achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety and the environment” as not constituting an expropriation. 
Therefore, as long as the ADGSM or any of its successor regimes are seen to address a public welfare 
imperative, Australia will be able to deflect any expropriation claims in any ISDS setting under 
AANZFTA. Similar public welfare grounds can be found in other FTAs/BITs, albeit in different wordings.   
 
Overall, the ADGSM should always be looked upon as an exceptional measure that only provides 
temporary breathing room until 2023. The Australian Government must demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the ADGSM and stress the temporary nature of the measure; otherwise, the risk of a challenge 
increases over time. Even when a state-based espousal in the WTO appears to be a difficult proposition, 
the aggrieved foreign investor can import parallel arguments from the realm of WTO law to reinforce 
their claims in an ISDS setting.2 For policymakers in host states such as Australia, this means that the 
 
See also ‘Australia Wins Landmark World Trade Organisation Ruling on Tobacco Plain Packaging Laws’, ABC News 
(Web Page, 28 June 2018) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-29/australia-wins-landmark-wto-ruling-on-tobacco-
plain-packaging/9921972>.; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights’) (‘TRIPS Agreement’) 
2 This strategy is referred to as the “Convergence Argument” in academic literature (see e.g. discussion in Umair Ghori, 
‘The Confluence of International Trade and Investment: Exploring the Nexus between Export Controls and Indirect 
Expropriation’ (forthcoming, February 2020) New Zealand Yearbook of International Law; Jurgen Kurtz, ‘The Use and 
Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of 
International Law 749, 751–759, 770–771; Robert Howse and Efraim Chalamish, ‘The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in 
Investor-State Arbitration: A Reply to Jurgen Kurtz’ (2010) 20(4) European Journal of International Law 1087, 1088–
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design of export controls must be such that it remains compatible with both trade and investment 
norms. 
 
Despite the potential for challenge, the reputation of Australia as an ideal investment venue is likely 
to remain intact. However, the government and the stakeholders must address the issue of pricing, 
development of new gas fields, incoming investments in the gas sector and the allegations by some 
stakeholders accusing the large gas exporters of cartel-like behavior.   
 
     
2) Implications if LNG export caps or quotas are imposed 
 
Australia may potentially face a claim for indirect expropriation by foreign investors under an ISDS 
setting or a claim under WTO law if quotas or export caps are imposed under the ADGSM. In response 
to a WTO action, Australia will likely base its defensive strategy on GATT Article XI.3  
 
Generally speaking, GATT Article XI:1 bans the use of quotas by a WTO Member except in limited 
instances which are explained in GATT Article XI:2. GATT Article XI:2(a) permits WTO Members to 
“temporarily” restrict exports to prevent or relieve “critical” shortage of food or other essential 
materials.  
 
In order to safely adopt the defence of GATT Article XI:2(a), the ADGSM must be seen as addressing 
“critical” shortage of an essential material (i.e., gas) within the domestic market.  The problem here is 
that there is, per se, no critical shortage of gas in Australia. Rather, the gas shortage may be imminent 
unless the LNG producers divert a certain for meeting domestic demand. 
 
In this regard, understanding the WTO dispute settlement decision of China – Raw Materials 
becomes especially important for the Australian policymakers since it provides crucial clues in 
deciphering the meaning of an important standard on which the defence of a “temporary” measure for 
relieving “critical” shortage is based. 
 
In China – Raw Materials, China was held by the WTO Appellate Body to have failed in demonstrating 
that its export quotas on certain raw materials were temporarily applied to relieve a “critical” shortage. 
Preceding the Appellate Body proceedings, the dispute settlement panel in the case noted that any 
restriction under GATT Article XI:2(a) must be of limited duration. There is no doubt that this is an 
explicit acknowledgment by the WTO of the risk within GATT Article XI:2(a) for protectionist abuse, 
e.g., the panel observed that China had imposed export controls on bauxite for nearly a decade and that 
there were no signs of the export control measures being lifted until the bauxite reserves were 
depleted.  
 
On appeal from the dispute settlement panel, the Appellate Body observed that “temporarily,” in 
GATT Article XI:2(a), means measures applied to meet a “passing need” or measures applied on an 
interim basis. The Appellate Body report also clarified that what makes a shortage “critical” is how 
“essential” a product is for the exporting economy along with the general characteristics of that 
 
1090; Alford (n 98) 37; Frank Garcia et al, ‘Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International 
Trade Law’ (2015) 18(4) Journal of International Economic Law 861, 864; Brooks Allen and Tommaso Soave, 
‘Jurisdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute Settlement and Investment Arbitration’ (2014) 30(1) Arbitration International 1, 
28; Andrea Bjorklund, ‘Convergence or Complementarity’ (2013) 12(1) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 65, 
68–70; Sergio Puig, ‘The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law’ (2015) 33(1) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 1, 23–27; Roger Alford, ‘The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration’ (2014) 
12(1) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 35, 46–47.  
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 forms part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Framework. Note that some Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as Malaysia-Australia FTA (MAFTA) already refer to 
GATT Article XI as the applicable standard in determining when export of certain goods can be restricted (see MAFTA, 
Article 2.10).   
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product. The Appellate Body further explained that the notion of “criticality” includes consideration of 
points in time where the conditions no longer remain “critical.”  
 
The observation made here that there is no actual gas shortage in Australia is not prejudicial to the 
interpretation of the WTO law. In another WTO case involving Chinese export controls (China – Rare 
Earths), the dispute settlement panel endorsed the position that WTO Members are entitled to take 
measures where shortages of a “critical” product are imminent and have yet to materialise.  
 
The challenge for the Australian Government is to avoid the trap of extending “temporary” 
restrictions to the point where such restrictions become part of the regulatory landscape (similar to 
what was pointed out by the Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials). Timely emergence of new gas 
sources or alternatives to the ADGSM is important because there may still be risks of shortfalls in gas 
supply after the expiration of the ADGSM in 2023.  
 
In the absence of any new gas projects coming online and gas shortfalls emerging from 2024 
onwards, the likelihood of the ADGSM being extended beyond its “temporary” period means that any 
regulatory measures imposing quota restrictions or export caps on LNG invite the risk of violating WTO 
norms. Therefore, the emphasis here is for the Australian Government to understand the WTO’s 
interpretation of “temporary” in line of the cases mentioned hereinabove. 
 
 
3) Justification of ADGSM export restrictions under the “necessary” argument 
 
GATT Article XX provides a series of general exceptions that allow WTO Members to derogate from 
their obligations, provided certain limited grounds are met. Considering the characteristics of the 
ADGSM, Australia may consider the defences of GATT Article XX(d) (measures “necessary” to secure 
compliance with local laws that are not inconsistent with the GATT) and/or XX(j) (measures “essential” 
to the acquisition and distribution of products general or local short supply). 
 
The main connector in the application of GATT Article XX(d) is “necessary.” Several WTO cases have 
interpreted this term. However, two notable cases for Australian policymakers in this regard are Korea 
– Beef and the EC — Tariff Preferences case. 
 
In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body endorsed the argument that the interpretation of “necessary” 
requires “weighing and balancing” of several factors. The Australian Government must be able to 
demonstrate that several alternatives to the ADGSM were considered before its triggering and, on 
balance, the ADGSM was the least-trade restrictive measure.  
 
In the EC – Tariff Preferences case, it was held that when a country adopts any exceptional trade 
measure and then uses the “necessary” standard to defend it, the measures must be proven as useful to 
achieve the stated goals. In the EC – Tariff Preferences case, the EC attempted to justify the ‘Drug 
Arrangement’ within its Generalised System of Preferences (‘GSP’) scheme which extended preferential 
treatment to certain pre-selected countries. The EC measures were viewed as violating the GATT Most 
Favoured Nation (‘MFN’) obligations under Article I:1.  
 
The dispute settlement panel in EC – Tariff Preferences rejected EC’s justification that the Drug 
Arrangement enables economic development in countries facing narcotics problems by extending trade 
facilities and preferential entry to goods.  The panel, in its reasoning, pointed out the declining utility of 
GSP schemes, lack of monitoring, lax compliance mechanisms for measuring “effectiveness” and the 
availability of less trade-restrictive options.  
 
The EC – Tariff Preferences case underscores an important point for the Australian Government, i.e. 
in order for the ADGSM to be held as “necessary,” the measures adopted thereunder must be 
demonstrated as effective in achieving its stated aim. A cursory review of the submissions received in 
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the recent 2019 Review of the ADGSM shows that many stakeholders view the ADGSM as an ineffective 
measure to bring down the price levels for gas in the domestic market.4 In the event of a challenge, the 
points raised by domestic stakeholders and the financial/economic analysis on pricing level by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)5 will likely be considered in the WTO to 
counter the “necessary” argument by Australia. 
 
In addition to the preceding argument, review of other trade disputes such as EC – Asbestos and 
Brazil Retreaded Tyres shows that the WTO expects the restraining Member to have already undertaken 
a comparative analysis of the measure in light of possible, less-trade restrictive alternatives. It will be 
very difficult for Australia to defend its position with the questionable effectiveness of the ADGSM in 
reducing gas prices.  
 
The question of “necessary,” therefore, represents a sum of multiple considerations that places the 
burden of proof onto the WTO Member adopting the restrictive trade measure (i.e. Australia). The 
considerations include (i) the importance of the interests or values at issue; (ii) the contribution of the 
measure to the objective pursued; (iii) the trade restrictiveness of the measure; (iv) the availability of 
the WTO-consistent or less trade-restrictive alternative measures.  
 
 
4) Justification of ADGSM export restrictions under the “essential” argument 
 
Another possible defence of the ADGSM can be under GATT Article XX (j) which enables a WTO Member 
to adopt measures that are “essential” to the acquisition or distribution of products in short supply. 
Interestingly, this defence has only ever been used once before in WTO dispute settlement (India – Solar 
Cells). 
 
In interpreting “essential,” the Appellate Body referred to past jurisprudence on the term 
“necessary” and then extended the argument to explain the “essential” criteria. More specifically, the 
Appellate Body stated in India – Solar Cells that design and necessity factors under GATT Article XX(d) 
are relevant in interpreting Article XX(j) as well. The Appellate Body explained that any WTO Member 
imposing a trade-restrictive measure must satisfy the “design” element by establishing a link between 
the measures and “acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply.” The 
“essential” standard is activated only when the “design” element is satisfied because if the measure in 
question is not accomplishing the aim of “acquisition or distribution of products in general or local 
short supply” then it cannot be justified under GATT Article XX(j).  
 
The Appellate Body noted that the word “essential” is closer to the indispensable end of the word 
“necessary” because the word “essential” is itself defined as “absolutely indispensable or necessary.” 
The proposition seems to suggest that the “essential” test is more stringent even when it shares a 
common pedigree with the “necessary” test. However, there are no more cases beyond India – Solar 
Cells where the Appellate Body can demonstrate the stringent nature of the Article XX (j) “essential” 
test. 
 
 
4 See e.g. ACCC, ‘Gas Inquiry 2017-2020’ Interim Report (July 2019)  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Gas%20inquiry%20July%202019%20interim%20report.pdf>, 17-18.; See also 
Mark Ogge, ‘Just to Cap it Off: Submission to the 2019 Review of the ADGSM’, The Australia Institute (September 
2019), 1, 6-10; Bruce Robertson, ‘Towards a Domestic Gas Reservation in Australia’, Institute for Energy Economics 
and Financial Analysis (submission to the DIIS, July 2019), 2, 17-18; Bruce Robertson, ‘IEEFA Submission to the 2019 
Review of the ADGSM’, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (submission to the DIIS, July 2019), 1-
4; Lock the Gate Alliance, ‘Submission to the 2019 Review of the ADGSM’ (undated) 1-3.  
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The Appellate Body in India – Solar Cells also endorsed a replication of the “weighing and balancing” 
series of factors used in the “necessity” analysis under GATT Article XX(d) for interpreting “essential” 
under GATT Article XX(j).  
 
Therefore, judging by the way the Appellate Body has handled the meaning of “essential,” it can 
easily be surmised that “essentiality” and “necessity” standards are conceptually similar but with 
varying degree of stringency. Both standards require assessing the extent to which the adopted 
measures contribute to the “acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply" 
along with the relative importance of the societal interests that the measures protect and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measures.  
 
 
5) Concluding thoughts 
 
The defence under WTO law of the ADGSM, or any regime that succeeds it, is a multi-faceted 
undertaking. Australian Government must consider the nature of the ADGSM as well as the WTO norms 
on “necessary,” “essential,” “effectiveness” and “weighing and balancing” in the light of reasonably 
available alternatives.  
 
The challenge for Australian policymakers is certainly not made easy by the fact that the 
consequences of the ADGSM cannot be fully measured as effective unless it is triggered. If, however, the 
ADGSM is triggered then the likelihood of a challenge by major importing countries increases. 
Therefore, the anticipation by the Australian Government of the grounds of any future challenge 
assumes critical importance for the long-term stability of gas prices in the country. 
 
It is hoped that the above analysis is useful in securing Australia’s national interest and energy 
security. The author is available to assist the DIIS or further discuss any aspect of this submission.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Umair Ghori 
LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD 
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,  
Bond University, ROBINA QLD 4229 
E-mail: ughori@bond.edu.au 
Phone: +61 7 5595 1286 
Fax: +61 7 5595 1007  
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ANNEX 1: Investor breakdown of major LNG projects in Australia by the origin and 
possible FTA/BIT coverage 
 
 
PROJECT INVESTOR/ 
SHAREHOLDER 
ORIGIN OF 
INVESTORS 
POSSIBLE FTA/BIT 
COVERAGE 
 
PRELUDE 
FLNG 
Royal Dutch Shell 
KOGAS 
INPEX Group 
 
UK, South 
Korea & 
Japan 
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
KAFTA; CPTPP  
NORTHWEST 
SHELF 
VENTURE 
Woodside Petroleum 
BHP Billiton  
BP 
Chevron 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Japan Australia LNG 
 
UK, US, 
Japan & 
Australia 
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
AUSFTA; CPTPP 
PLUTO LNG Woodside Petroleum 
Kansai 
Tokyo Gas 
 
Australia & 
Japan 
JAEPA; CPTPP 
GORGON  Chevron Australia 
Shell Australia 
Mobil Australia 
Osaka Gas 
Tokyo Gas 
Chubu Electric 
 
UK, US, 
Japan & 
Australia 
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
AUSFTA; CPTPP 
WHEATSTONE Chevron Australia 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Woodside Petroleum 
KUFPEC 
Kyushu Electric 
 
UK, US, 
Japan, 
Kuwait & 
Australia 
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
AUSFTA; CPTPP;  
DARWIN ConocoPhillips 
Santos 
INPEX Group 
Eni 
JERA 
Tokyo Gas 
 
US, 
Australia, 
Japan, Italy  
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
AUSFTA; CPTPP 
ICHTHYS INPEX Group  
Total 
CPC Corporation  
Tokyo Gas 
Osaka Gas 
Kansai Electric Power  
JERA 
Toho Gas 
Japan, 
France, 
Taiwan & 
Australia 
EUAFTA (proposed); CPTPP 
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AUSTRALIA 
PACIFIC LNG 
Origin 
ConocoPhillips 
Sinopec 
 
Australia, US 
& China 
AUSFTA; ChAFTA 
QUEENSLAND 
CURTIS LNG 
Royal Dutch Shell 
CNOOC, Tokyo Gas 
 
UK, China & 
Japan 
EUAFTA (proposed); JAEPA; 
ChAFTA 
GLADSTONE 
LNG 
Santos 
PETRONAS 
Total 
KOGAS 
Australia, 
Malaysia, 
EU, South 
Korea, 
France 
MAFTA; AANZFTA; EUAFTA 
(proposed); KAFTA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
